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§1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty-fi ve years, the European Union has developed a far-reaching legal regime aimed at countering money laundering. Th e evolution of this regime has been linked inextricably with the parallel development of global standards in the fi eld, most notably by the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). Th is article will critically evaluate the content of EU anti-money laundering law, by putting forward a comprehensive typology of the EU anti-money laundering regime as outlined in the successive EU Anti-Money Laundering Directives (AML Directives) 1 and consisting of three elements: the criminalization of money laundering and terrorist fi nance; the prevention of money laundering via the imposition of a series of duties on the private sector; and the focus on fi nancial intelligence, via the establishment and co-operation of fi nancial intelligence units responsible for receiving and analysing reports received from the private sector.
Th e article will examine the evolution of EU law as regards all elements of anti-money laundering law, by focusing in particular on the changes brought forward by the postLisbon Fourth Money Laundering Directive. Th e article will cast light on the infl uence of the FATF in shaping these standards and highlight the impact of the ever expanding EU anti-money laundering legal framework on fundamental rights and the rule of law. §2 .
AN EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORK SHAPED BY GLOBALIZATION
In examining the evolution of EU anti-money laundering law, it is essential to bear in mind that the development of standards in the fi eld refl ects a remarkable combination of global and regional standard-setting eff orts. Th e European Union has been active in a number of international fora producing international treaties in the fi eld, most notably in the United Nations (the main treaties being the Vienna Convention in 1988, focusing on the laundering of the proceeds of drug traffi cking, and the Convention on Transnational Organised Crime, or the Palermo Convention, of 2000) and in the Council of Europe. 2 However, even more central to the development of the EU anti-money laundering legal framework has been the work of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 3 Th e FATF is an ad hoc body, established by the G7 in 1989 under the auspices of the OECD. 4 Its membership is selective, including OECD states at fi rst and expanding since then to include 'strategically important' countries and largely to refl ect fi nancial globalization. 5 When looking at FATF membership today, it is striking that all 15 'old' EU Member States, along with the Commission, are now full FATF members. However, none of the 12 Member States which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 is a FATF member (they are all members of MONEYVAL -the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures, established in 1997 under the auspices of the Council of Europe). Th is piecemeal membership means that the Union's executive, the European Commission, can have an infl uence together with certain Member States, in the shaping of FATF standards and ensuring compliance with these standards, but that participation in regional fora such as the Council of Europe is equally important for the EU in order to put forward a further layer of compliance with global standards -with MONEYVAL benchmarks are not limited to Council of Europe standards but also include FATF, UN and EU anti-money laundering standards. 6 Th e main normative output of the FATF has been a series of Recommendations, evolving over time and covering a wide range of aspects of the fi ght against money laundering. Th e 40 FATF Recommendations produced in 1990 were revised in 1996, 2003 and 2012, with money laundering counter-measures being deemed necessary to counter a series of emerging and new threats, from drug traffi cking to organized crime to terrorism. 7 with the renewal and gradual expansion of the FATF mandate to now include action against money laundering, the fi nancing of terrorism and now proliferation. 8 Th e rapid evolution and expansion in the FATF mandate, standards and membership can be attributed to its informal nature 9 and network structure which aims at fl exibility and adaptability. 10 Although the FATF output takes the form of Recommendations which could be characterized as 'soft law', 11 their infl uence on the development of EU antimoney laundering law has been considerable. All EU anti-money laundering directives have been justifi ed as necessary to implement FATF Recommendations in the European Union legal order. 12 Th is strategy has contributed in particular to the extension of the scope of the EU anti-money laundering framework. Th e fi rst AML Directive served primarily to introduce the preventive framework of the FATF Recommendations into EU law. 13 Th e second AML Directive was justifi ed by the Commission as necessary to implement (and go beyond) the revised FATF Recommendations of 1996. 14 Both main changes introduced by the Directive (namely the extension of the money laundering predicate off ences and the extension of preventive duties to non-fi nancial professions) were justifi ed by reference to FATF fi ndings and requirements: the Preamble to the Directive stated that there has been a trend in recent years towards a much wider defi nition of money laundering based on a broader range of predicate underlying off ences, as refl ected for example in the 1996 revision of the 40 Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, the leading international body devoted to the fi ght against money laundering. In the context of the FATF, it can be argued that the regular revision of both mandate and standards has been easier compared to a more formal international organization. See 
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265 Th e Commission also accepted that there is a trend towards the increased use by money launderers of non-fi nancial businesses as confi rmed by the work of the FATF on money laundering techniques and typologies. 16 On the basis of these fi ndings, the second AML Directive extended the list of predicate off ences and the list of professions to be covered by the Directive obligations, to include inter alia lawyers. 17 Th e third Money Laundering Directive, adopted in 2005, extended the scope of the legislation to cover the fi ght against terrorist fi nance, a key political priority post-9/11, and updated existing legislation in the light of international regulatory developments in the fi eld, most notably regarding customer identifi cation. 18 Th e Directive presented a major overhaul of the provisions on prevention -in particular those provisions on customer identifi cation -in the light of the revised FATF Recommendations in the fi eld, introducing a number of FATF-inspired concepts such as the so-called 'risk-based approach' to customer identifi cation and more detailed provisions on benefi cial ownership and 'politically exposed persons'. 19 Ensuring compliance with the FATF Recommendations has also been the driver for the negotiation and adoption of the fourth AML Directive: Th e Commission's Explanatory Note to its proposal for the fourth AML Directive argues that 'a revision of the Directive at this time is complementary to the revised FATF Recommendations, which in themselves represent a substantial strengthening of the anti-money laundering and combating terrorist fi nancing framework'. 20 Th e need to align EU law to the revised FATF Recommendations is also refl ected in the Preamble to the fourth AML Directive. Recital 4 states that:
Money laundering and terrorist fi nancing are frequently carried out in an international context. Measures adopted solely at national or even at Union level, without taking into account international coordination and cooperation, would have very limited eff ect. Th e measures adopted by the Union in that fi eld should therefore be compatible with, and at least as stringent as, other actions undertaken in international fora. Union action should continue to take particular account of the FATF Recommendations and instruments of other international bodies active in the fi ght against money laundering and terrorist fi nancing. With a view to reinforcing the effi cacy of the fi ght against money laundering and terrorist fi nancing, the relevant Union legal acts should, where appropriate, be aligned with the International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation adopted by the FATF in February 2012 (the 'revised FATF Recommendations').
16
Ibid., Recital 14.
17
Human rights concerns with regard to fair trial rights by the European Parliament have led to negotiations on the Directive being extended to the Conciliation stage -agreement was reached aft er the Directive was packaged as an emergency counter-terrorism measure in the weeks aft er 9/11. For an overview, see V. Mitsilegas, Money Laundering Counter-measures in the European Union. Th e infl uence of the FATF on the shaping of EU law is also evident in the Commission's impact assessment accompanying the proposal for the fourth AML Directive, according to which one of the key 'problem drivers' is that the existing EU rules are inconsistent with the recently revised international anti-money laundering standards and explains that there is a strong incentive on jurisdictions to correct inconsistencies with the international standards. Full compliance can send an important reputational signal which is vital for countries seeking to attract foreign investment. On the other hand non-compliance is subject to an attentive follow-up process by the FATF. Persistent noncompliance can lead to inclusion in one of the FATF's Public Statements on political and reputational damage. 21 Th e infl uence of FATF standards on the development of EU anti-money laundering law raises a number of rule of law concerns. FATF standards have been developed by a single-agenda ad hoc body with selective membership and a minimum level of transparency and accountability in its operations. 22 Th e operation of the FATF in these terms serves to depoliticize the discussion on the need for new anti-money laundering measures which increasingly strengthen the arm of the state and to produce an expert orthodoxy in terms of both money laundering typologies and the necessary measures to counter the phenomenon. 23 Th e need for the extension and renewal of both the FATF and its Recommendations has been constantly been accepted as a given, 24 and each 21 Commission Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing and the proposal for a Regulation on information accompanying transfers of funds, SWD(2013) 21 fi nal, p. 18.
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For a general analysis of the transparency and accountability defi cit, relevant also in the context of the FATF, see J. Cohen and C.F. Sabel, 'Global Democracy?', 37 NYU Journal of International Law and Policy (2004-2005) , p. 763. Th ey note that 'to a substantial and growing extent, then, rulemaking directly aff ecting the freedom of action of individuals, fi rms, and nation states (and the making of the rules to regulate this rulemaking) is taking place, undemocratically but not entirely unaccountably, in global settings created by the world's nations but no longer under their eff ective control' (ibid., p. 764). 267 production or revision of the FATF Recommendations has been mostly adopted without criticism by the European Commission in its proposals for Union law in the fi eld and subsequently by Member States in the Council and by the European Parliament as colegislators. In this manner, a specifi c agenda developed by technocrats and with limited scrutiny at the global level has been legitimized, via the EU decision-making process, and adopted at the Union level to bind both FATF and non-FATF members. §3. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING A key component of the EU's anti-money laundering strategy has been in line with global developments in the fi eld -the creation of a series of new money laundering off ences. Th e fi rst AML Directive introduced in the EU legal order gives a defi nition of money laundering largely following the standard wording of the 1988 Vienna Convention on drug traffi cking. 25 Th e defi nition of the main elements of money laundering has remained the same since. What has evolved over time has been the extension -again in line with global developments in the fi eld -of the money laundering predicate off ences, namely the crimes which are deemed to generate proceeds for the purposes of EU antimoney laundering law. Th e extension of the list of predicate off ences mirrors the analysis of money laundering as a chameleon threat evolving over time. 26 Indeed, in line with FATF policy, 27 EU law has moved from the prohibition of money laundering of the proceeds of drug traffi cking (to address the priorities of the so-called 'war on drugs' in the late 1980s and early 1990s) to move in subsequent decades towards the prohibition of the laundering of the proceeds of organized and serious crime (to address the threat of organized crime), and, post-9/11, and notwithstanding the substantial diff erences between the two off ences, 28 to add terrorist fi nance to the EU money laundering prohibition regime. 29 As will be seen below, the fourth AML Directive adds to the proliferation of this list by expressly requiring Member States to treat tax off ences as predicate off ences. Th is expansive approach raises a number of questions regarding the observance of the principle of legality at EU level and the extent to which legislative and policy choices in the fi elds may lead to uncritical over-criminalization. Th e main diff erences between money laundering and terrorist fi nance involve: the sums involved; the fact that money laundering refers to crimes already committed whereas terrorist fi nance is forward looking; and the fact that, unlike money laundering, terrorist fi nance may not involve proceeds of crime (on the latter point see V. Mitsilegas, in A. Edwards and P. Gill (eds.), Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on Global Security). 
A. THE EUROPEAN LEGALITY DIMENSION
A key rule of law question in the adoption of EU money laundering law has been the choice of legal basis. Legal basis questions emerged at the time of the negotiations of the fi rst AML Directive. Th is was in 1990, before the Maastricht Treaty, which conferred for the fi rst time upon the European Union the express competence to legislate in criminal matters, entered into force. Arguably money laundering legislation is predominantly of a criminal law nature and the primary objective is to combat crime: fi nding a legal basis in the pre-Maastricht EC Treaty raised legality concerns in view of the limits of Community competence to adopt legislation on criminal off ences and sanctions. Th e solution reached was to adopt the fi rst AML Directive under a dual free movement/internal market legal basis under the justifi cation that preventing money laundering was essential to ensure the integrity of the Community fi nancial system and the internal market. 31 Th is solution was combined with a choice of wording in the fi rst AML Directive which obliged Member States to prohibit (rather than criminalize) money laundering.
In practice, all Member States treated the money laundering conduct defi ned in the fi rst AML Directive within their criminal law, establishing new money laundering off ences. Notwithstanding the express conferral upon the European Union of competence to defi ne criminal off ences and impose criminal sanctions aft er the Maastricht Treaty under the third pillar and the rulings of the Court of Justice in the cases on environmental crime and ship-source pollution which paved the way for criminalization under the former fi rst pillar, 32 the Union legislator continued to use the internal market legal basis of the fi rst AML Directive in the adoption of the second and third AML Directives, both adopted aft er the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. 33 Th e post-Lisbon fourth AML Directive is no exception. It has been adopted under the internal market legal basis of Article 114 TFEU, with the text of the fourth AML Directive continuing to state that money laundering (and terrorist fi nance) must be prohibited (and not criminalized). 34 Th is choice is all the more striking in view of the abolition of the third pillar and the introduction of an express 'functional criminalisation' EU competence in Article 83(2) TFEU, under which the Union has the power to adopt legislation defi ning criminal off ences and imposing criminal sanctions when such measures are essential to ensure the eff ective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to 31 Articles 57(2) and 100(A) EC, now Articles 47(2) and 95 TFEU respectively. For an analysis of negotiations and outcome, see V. Mitsilegas, Money Laundering Counter-measures in the EU, p. 56-63. 
269
harmonization measures. 35 Th e choice of the Union legislator to disregard the express criminal law legal basis of Article 83(2) TFEU and base the fourth AML Directive solely on Article 114 TFEU is also at odds with a number of other EU criminal law measures with a fi nancial law dimension post-Lisbon. One example has been post-Lisbon secondary law on market abuse, where two parallel instruments -one on administrative and one on criminal law -have been adopted. 36 Another example has been the proposed directive on criminalizing fraud against the Union budget. Whereas the European Commission has opted in favour of exclusively using Article 325 TFEU as a legal basis 37 in negotiations in the Council Member States have opted for the use of Article 83(2) TFEU as the sole legal basis for this instrument. 38 Th e choice to use or not to use Article 83(2) TFEU is not merely symbolic. Using Article 83(2) TFEU has constitutional implications including the granting to Member States of the possibility of triggering an emergency brake in negotiations, the nonparticipation of Denmark in the adoption of the instrument and the possibility of an opt-out for the United Kingdom and Ireland. 39 Th e use of Article 114 TFEU as the sole legal basis for the fourth AML Directive ensures maximum participation by EU Member States in its provisions.
B. THE EXPANSION OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING PREDICATE OFFENCES
As mentioned above, the evolution of EU anti-money laundering law has been characterized by a constant extension of the list of money laundering predicate off ences. Article 3(4) of the fourth AML Directive includes as predicate off ences terrorism, drug traffi cking, organized crime, fraud, corruption and all off ences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a maximum of more than one year or, as regards Member States that have a minimum threshold for off ences in their legal system, all off ences punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a minimum of more than six months. It is clear thus that the EU has moved to a model of the criminalization of money laundering on an all-crimes basis. Some of the predicate off ences are defi ned by reference to European Union (terrorism, organized crime, fraud) or United Nations (drug traffi cking) criminal law measures in the fi eld. Others however (including corruption, notwithstanding the existence of both EU and international law norms in the fi eld) and other off ences falling within the generic penalty threshold defi nition in Article 3(4)(f) of the fourth AML Directive, however, are not defi ned by reference to other EU law or international instruments and many of them remain unharmonized at EU level. Th is choice poses signifi cant challenges to legal certainty, in particular in the operation of EU mutual recognition measures such as the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, where mutual recognition of judgments related to money laundering must take place without the requirement for executing authorities to verify the existence of dual criminality. 40 Th e fourth AML Directive has continued the trend towards the extension of the money laundering predicate off ences by expressly including in this list tax off encesdefi ned as tax crimes relating to direct taxes and indirect taxes. 41 Th is addition raises concerns, particularly since no harmonization of the defi nitions of tax crimes has taken place at EU level and, as indicated in the Commission proposal for the fourth AML Directive, there was no intention to do so. 42 As a result, diff erent tax off ences may be designated at the national level, potentially aff ecting the implementation of other rules of the fourth AML Directive.
In its Impact Assessment, the Commission had contended that designing detailed rules for the circumstances in which the off ence is committed would be the optimal option, as it would ensure coherence across the EU, send a clear signal with respect to tax crimes and ensure the effi ciency of cooperation. 43 However, it pointed out that it would 'entail substantial delays due to political diffi culties in agreeing a common list of types of tax evasion', 44 thus delaying an overall agreement. Th erefore, the Commission opted for an approach whereby the existing threshold applied in serious crimes would See the Commission Proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing, COM(2013) 45 fi nal, p. 14. 43 Commission Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing and the proposal for a Regulation on information accompanying transfers of funds, SWD(2013) 21 fi nal, p. 39. 44 Ibid.
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be used without the adoption of a precise defi nition. Th e Parliament favoured a diff erent approach by noting that 'agreeing on a defi nition of tax crimes is an important step in detecting those crimes', without however, providing any suggestions on such a common defi nition. 45 In the light of these concerns, the Council proposed to include in Recital 11 of the fourth AML Directive a reference pointing out the diff erent defi nitions of tax off ences at the national level and noting that 'while no harmonisation of the defi nitions of tax crimes (…) is sought, Member States, should allow, to the greatest extent possible under their national law, the exchange of information or the provision of assistance between EU Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)'. 46 Th e express insertion of tax off ences within the Union's anti-money laundering framework may lead to a catch-all, undiff erentiated crime control strategy which fails to distinguish between the distinct features and rationale behind the criminal and regulatory response to tax off ences on the one hand and serious and organized crime on the other. As in the case of the introduction of terrorist fi nance within the Union's anti-money laundering framework, this approach may prove to be ineff ective by utilizing anti-money laundering tools for tackling a very distinct phenomenon. From a criminal law perspective, this development may have seriously adverse labelling implications. 47 Th e catch-all approach of the fourth AML Directive -which seems to have adopted a purely functionalist model of criminalization by inserting tax predicates in order to ensure maximum intelligence sharing -would thus undermine key principles of criminal law.
C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In addition to the prohibition of money laundering as such, EU anti-money laundering law has introduced sanctions for non-compliance with the money laundering preventive duties imposed by the AML Directives upon the private sector. Th e AML Directives leave considerable discretion to Member States regarding the types and levels of sanctions they can use, something which is confi rmed also by the fourth AML Directive. 48 However, the fourth AML Directive goes a step further than its previous incarnations. of the fourth AML Directive stipulates that in certain cases sanctions must be applied.
In particular, cases of serious, repetitive, systematic breaches or a combination of these concerning customer due diligence, suspicious transaction reporting, record-keeping or internal controls must be subject to sanctions. Th e EU legislator went a step further by including a list of minimum penalties for such cases: a public statement; 49 an order requiring the specifi c conduct to stop; withdrawal or suspension of authorization (where appropriate); a temporary ban from exercising managerial functions in obliged entities; and a maximum administrative pecuniary sanction of at least twice the amount of the benefi t derived from the breach or at least € 1,000,000. For breaches concerning a credit institution or fi nancial institution, the maximum pecuniary penalties for a legal person are at least € 5 million or 10% of the total annual turnover, and at least € 5 million for a natural person. Finally, the requirement that Member States produce statistical data is reinforced and refi ned by enlisting types of data that need to be compiled at the national level. 50 A key question with broader policy and constitutional implications concerns the relationship between criminal and administrative sanctions in this fi eld. Article 58(2) of the fourth AML Directive states that national rules on administrative sanctions implementing the fourth AML Directive will be without prejudice to the right of Member States to provide for and impose criminal sanctions, adding that Member States may decide not to lay down rules for administrative sanctions or measures for breaches which are subject to criminal sanctions in their national law.
However, it is questionable whether this lack of harmonization contributes towards the eff ectiveness of EU law in the fi eld. If the choice of the EU legislator has been to treat non-compliance with the preventive duties set out in the fourth AML Directive by administrative sanctions, then the choices of Member States to 'goldplate' implementation by imposing criminal sanctions should be limited by the requirement to ensure the eff ectiveness of EU law. Eff ectiveness in this context is not necessarily linked to criminalization, and, as with other post-Lisbon cases (including in particular the market abuse legislation), eff ectiveness of EU law may actually lead to de-criminalization, rather than over-criminalization. 51 49 Th e EDPS has highlighted that the publication of sanctions is not in line with necessity and proportionality rules and is not coupled with adequate safeguards for the rights of the individuals in question. See Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) on a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing, and a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds, 4.7.2013, https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/ Consultation/Opinions/2013/13-07-04_Money_laundering_EN.pdf, p. 12-13. 
§4. THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING
Th e imposition of a series of preventive duties upon the private sector constitutes the cornerstone of any anti-money laundering regime. Th e co-opting of the private sector by the state in the fi ght against money laundering is a key example of what David Garland has called the responsibilization strategy. 52 In the case of money laundering, this strategy has been promoted by the FATF, and implemented in detail by the EU. Key duties of the private sector in this context constitute customer identifi cation, record keeping, reporting of suspicious transactions and the duty not to 'tip off ' customers or other relevant persons in money laundering investigations. 53 Th e imposition of preventive duties on the private sector has evolved over time in two respects. Firstly, the revision of FATF Recommendations and subsequent amendments of the EU AML Directives have expanded the scope of the professions which are subject to anti-money laundering preventive duties, from banks and fi nancial institutions initially to other regulated professions such as lawyers and accountants, to less regulated sectors including 'other persons trading in goods to the extent that payments are made or received in cash in an amount of EUR 10 000 or more, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked'. 54 Th e extension of anti-money laundering preventive duties to less regulated sectors raises serious questions of the feasibility of compliance and eff ectiveness of prevention in sectors of limited regulation and resources.
Th e extension of the list of professions covered by money laundering legislation has created controversy in particular regarding the imposition of preventive duties to lawyers, with the latter arguing that these duties are contrary to the relationship of trust between lawyer and client and challenge the rights of fair trial and protection of private and family life.
Since the adoption of the second AML Directive, there have been attempts to balance confl icting interests by covering notaries and independent legal professionals primarily in the context of fi nancial transactions. 55 EU law exempts them from the second AML Directive's duties when they ascertain the legal position of their clients or they represent their clients in legal proceedings. 56 It has also done so by allowing Member States to designate an appropriate self-regulatory body other than the FIU to receive suspicious transaction reports. Both the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have ruled that such EU law 57 complies with the right to fair trial 58 and the right to privacy 59 respectively. It is noteworthy in this context that the European Court of Human Rights has in eff ect legitimized the role of the FATF in developing anti-money laundering standards and in assessing Member States' anti-money laundering performance. 60 Th e Court noted in particular in response to the claimant's argument that the imposition of duties on lawyers was ineff ective that this was not the case since the FATF found that France's methods of combating money laundering and the fi nancing of terrorism were among the most eff ective in the world. 61 Th e second feature in the development of anti-money laundering preventive duties has been the elaboration in greater detail and sophistication of the content of these duties. Two seemingly confl icting trends can be discerned in this context. On the one hand, the categories of individuals and companies to be monitored under know-your-customer and due diligence requirements have proliferated, to include expressly and in greater detail, as will be seen below, benefi cial owners and politically exposed persons. On the other hand, a prescriptive approach focusing on routine compliance with preventive duties -including for example the routine reporting of suspicious transactions if they exceed a certain threshold -has been replaced by the adoption of a so-called 'risk-based approach' to compliance. 62 Th e adoption of a 'risk-based approach' can be seen as an attempt to move from mechanical compliance to a system where the quality of compliance -and in particular customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reports -is enhanced. As has been noted, in the risk-based approach, cooperation becomes active and dynamic as professionals must design an anti-money laundering model which is suited to make the use of fi nancial structures and networks more diffi cult for money launderers. 63 While it remains to be seen whether the 'risk-based approach' will lead to a more eff ective anti-money laundering framework, it must be noted that by granting a greater degree of discretion to the private sector, it may create a greater degree of legal uncertainty for those called upon to comply with the preventive anti-money laundering duties. Th e extent to which the adoption of a risk-based approach would constitute a defence or exonerate the private sector from administrative or criminal liability for alleged non- compliance with preventive anti-money laundering duties is not particularly clear. Th e fourth AML Directive has further developed both these trends (on the extension of the web of monitoring while at the same time employing a risk-based approach) and the main new features will be examined below.
A. THE EXTENSION OF PREVENTIVE DUTIES RATIONE PERSONAE
Th e fi rst extension of the scope of the fourth AML Directive involves the gambling industry. According to Article 2(1)(f) of the fourth AML Directive, the requirement for applying customer due diligence is extended to the whole gambling sector, and no longer to casinos only as was the case since the second AML Directive. 64 However, following an appropriate risk assessment, Member States may decide to exempt in full or in part providers of certain gambling services from the rules on the basis of a proven low risk posed by the nature and, where appropriate, the scale of operations of such services. Among the factors for such a risk assessment, Member States must consider the degree of vulnerability of the applicable transactions. Furthermore, any decision must be notifi ed to the Commission together with a justifi cation of the specifi c decision, including the extent to which the Commission reports have been taken into account. 65 Th is requirement, which goes beyond the FATF Recommendations, was deemed as necessary since national laws had already addressed the broader risks associated with other forms of gambling. 66 Consequently, from the point of view of the Commission, the issue at stake was not whether to include the gambling sector as a whole among the obliged entities, but rather whether this inclusion would be the rule, signifying that the gambling activities would be covered unless in cases of a low risk of money laundering, or the exception, entailing that these would be covered only when there is a proven higher risk. 67 Th e second extension of the scope of the Directive is found in Article 2(1)(e) of the fourth AML Directive, according to which persons dealing in goods and who receive payment in cash in an amount of € 10,000 or more are also included among the obliged 64 See also Recital 21 of fourth AML Directive. Ibid., p. 45.
entities. 68 As with gambling activities, the fourth AML Directive is a step ahead of the FATF Recommendations that set the threshold at € 15,000. Th e rationale was once again found in that a number of Member States had taken a stricter approach towards the requirement for traders to conduct customer due diligence either by applying identifi cation requirements at a lower threshold or by imposing an outright ban on payments in cash above certain thresholds. 69 Due to this diversity of thresholds, the Commission has received complaints that the proceeds of robberies and theft s committed in one Member State can be anonymously converted into cash in another Member State without the requirement to identify the customer if the amount of the transaction is less than € 15,000. 70
B. PREVENTION: STRENGTHENING THE RISK-BASED APPROACH
Th ere are three dimensions of risk-assessment and risk-management in the fourth AML Directive: the national dimension; the European Union (European Commission) dimension; and the private sector dimension. Regarding the national dimension, the fourth AML Directive places Member States under the obligation to ensure, in accordance with the risk-based approach, that its scope is extended in whole or in part to professions and to categories of undertakings, other than the obliged entities referred to in its Article 2(1), which engage in activities that are particularly likely to be used for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist fi nancing. 71 In addition to the obligation to widen the ratione personae scope of the fourth AML Directive following the risk-based approach (which may result in considerable discrepancies in the coverage of various professions from Member State to Member State), Article 7 of the fourth AML Directive places a duty on Member States to identify, assess, understand and mitigate the risks of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing, including any data protection concerns by having in place a mechanism or authority that would organize the national response to the risks identifi ed. Information would be extracted by the Commission reports.
In terms of the Union dimension of risk assessment, according to Article 6 of the fourth AML Directive, the Commission is entrusted with the task of assessing the risks of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing aff ecting the internal market and relating to cross border activities. Furthermore, with a view to protecting the proper functioning of the internal market, it is an obligation to identify high-risk countries, in terms of 68 It is noteworthy that the Commission proposal stipulated a threshold that was even lower, that is € 7,500. 
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countries that have strategic defi ciencies in their domestic anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism framework. Th e Commission's 'internal' risk assessment tasks in relation to EU Member States are coupled with parallel 'external' risk assessment duties. According to Article 9(1) and (2) of the fourth AML Directive, the Commission must identify third-country jurisdictions which have strategic defi ciencies in their national anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist fi nance regimes that pose signifi cant threats to the fi nancial system of the Union ('high-risk third countries') in order to protect the proper functioning of the internal market. Th e recent Commission Communication on terrorist fi nancing states that the Commission will accelerate its work under the fourth AML Directive to provide for the identifi cation of third countries with strategic defi ciencies in the area of anti-money laundering or countering terrorist fi nancing. 72 In terms of the private sector dimension of risk assessment, the fourth AML Directive places Member States under the duty to ensure that obliged entities take appropriate steps to identify and assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing, taking into account risk factors including those relating to their customers, countries or geographic areas, products, services, transactions or delivery channels. 73 Th ey must also ensure that obliged entities have in place policies, controls and procedures to mitigate and manage eff ectively the risks of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing identifi ed at the level of the Union, the Member State and the obliged entity. 74 In both cases, the measures taken must be proportionate to the nature and size of the obliged entities.
Furthermore, in relation to simplifi ed due diligence measures, the third AML Directive provided for exceptions in cases when the customers were credit or fi nancial institutions. Member States could allow professionals to disapply the measures to companies 'listed on a regulated market' within the scope of Directive 2004/39/ EC, 75 domestic public authorities, and other customers who represent a low risk of engaging in money laundering or terrorist fi nancing. In addition, customers who are public authorities or bodies could benefi t from simplifi ed due diligence under specifi c conditions. 76 Articles 15 and 16 of the fourth AML Directive stipulate far stricter rules by abolishing any of the aforementioned automatic entitlements. Instead, decisions on whether to apply simplifi ed due diligence would be based on the low risk characterizing transactions or customer relationships. Th e European Supervisory Authorities will adopt guidelines as to the risk factors to be taken into 
C. THE TARGETS OF MONITORING: POLITICALLY-EXPOSED PERSONS
In an attempt to strengthen the preventive side of the fourth AML Directive, the defi nition and treatment of politically exposed persons (PEPs) as potentially risky individuals has undergone signifi cant change. Th e third AML Directive defi ned PEPs as the 'natural persons who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions and immediate family members, or persons known to be close associates, of such persons', 78 while that Directive required enhanced due diligence measures in relation to those residing in another Member Stare or in a third country. 79 Similarly, the 2012 FATF Recommendations made a distinction between foreign and domestic PEPs and provided examples of specifi c positions they may hold in order to fall under each category. Furthermore, risk-based requirements for domestic PEPs were introduced, so that obliged entities would be under diff erent levels of obligation in respect of foreign and domestic PEPs. Th e fourth AML Directive departs signifi cantly from the FATF approach and goes beyond the international standards and the existing rules; not only does it drop the diff erentiation between foreign and domestic PEPs, but also it lists the specifi c posts that an individual may hold in order to qualify as a PEP in an exhaustive manner. 80 Similarly, clarifi cations are provided in relation to the terms 'family members' and 'persons known to be close associates' which cannot be found in the FATF Recommendations. 81 More importantly, the fourth AML Directive prescribes that enhanced due diligence is required for all types of PEPs irrespective of whether they are foreign or domestic. 82 In the Commission's own words, 'this option would give greater clarity and more consistency to the provisions, while placing the EU ahead of the international standard'. 83 Th erefore, instead of a graduated approach, whereby obliged entities would have to assess the risks that domestic PEPs pose on the basis of risk sensitive elements, 84 the EU legislator 77 Article 17 of third AML Directive. Commission Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing and the proposal for a Regulation on information accompanying transfers of funds, SWD(2013) 21 fi nal, p. 42. 84 Th is approach may create some confusion to obliged entities, which would need to apply diff erent standards to diff erence categories of PEPs. Instead, the Commission approach will come at a higher cost for industry, without a corresponding benefi t. 279 opted for treating PEPs in their entirety as automatically high-risk individuals to which enhanced due diligence should apply. Th is development is a welcome step as national offi cials and those appointed by international organizations may be used by money launderers given their prominent status.
D. THE TARGETS OF MONITORING: BENEFICIAL OWNERS AND THE CHALLENGES TO DATA PROTECTION
Th e anti-money laundering preventive framework involves scrutiny of fi nancial transactions in the context of customers' fi nancial or credit institutions as well as other categories of a wide range of other service providers. Such operations necessarily involve processing, including the collection, retention and further transfer of an abundant amount of personal data of customers, which could potentially be used in investigations by law enforcement authorities. As such, the procedures of customer due diligence constitute an interference with the right to privacy and data protection, thus necessitating strict data protection requirements. Before the adoption of the fourth AML Directive, the inclusion of data protection rules was not a matter of concern in the prevention of money laundering and terrorism fi nancing. In a welcome step towards transparency and the protection of fundamental rights, the fourth AML Directive prescribes numerous data protection safeguards. Th ese safeguards were deemed necessary to accompany a key innovation of the fourth AML Directive, namely the obligation placed upon Member States to ensure that benefi cial ownership information is held in a central register in each Member State, for example a commercial register, companies register, or a public register. 85 Th e central register must ensure timely and unrestricted access by competent authorities and FIUs, without alerting the entity concerned and also allow timely access by obliged entities when taking customer due diligence measures. 86 In particular Recital 14 of the fourth AML Directive stipulates that obliged entities must obtain and hold 'adequate, accurate and current information on their benefi cial ownership, in addition to basic information such as the company name and address and proof of incorporation and legal ownership'. Benefi cial owners are natural persons who ultimately hold or control the customer and/or the natural person on whose behalf a transaction or activity is being conducted. Th ese references point to the direction of the data minimization and data quality principles without being accompanied by a specifi c list of the documents and data that would be adequate for the purpose of the fourth AML Directive. Furthermore, this information should be centrally stored in a register located outside the company but within each Member State. 85 Article 30(3) of fourth AML Directive. 86 Article 30(6) of fourth AML Directive.
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In order to address the divided views of Member States on the storage of data so that it can be accessed in a timely manner, the fourth AML Directive allows for ample fl exibility in selecting and/or establishing appropriate mechanisms which ensure unrestricted access. 87 Th erefore, Member States may use a central database specifi cally set up for storing benefi cial ownership information, or the business register or another central register. Th ey may also require obliged entities to fi ll in the register and they should make sure that information is available to competent authorities, FIUs or obliged entities when the latter take customer due diligence measures. In addition, other persons who are able to demonstrate a legitimate interest are granted access to the data. 88 While full public access is not explicitly foreseen, however, this may take root at the national level since Recital 15 of the fourth AML Directive allows Member States signifi cant leeway to provide for conditions of access that are wider than the provisions of the fourth AML Directive, thus potentially leading to divergent implementation at the national level. 89 However, Article 30(9) of the fourth AML Directive prescribes that Member States may refuse access to obliged entities or third parties exceptionally and on a case-by-case basis where such access would expose the benefi cial owner to the risk of fraud, kidnapping, blackmail, violence or intimidation or where the owner is a minor or otherwise incapable.
Recital 43 and Article 41(2) of the fourth AML Directive include a direct reference to the purpose limitation principle according to which the processing of personal data should be permitted only for the purposes of the Directive. 90 In addition, the collection and further processing of the data should be limited to what is strictly necessary and data should not be further processed in a way that is incompatible with that purpose. Processing for commercial purposes in particular is strictly prohibited.
Moreover, the retention period of the data appears to be a particularly problematic aspect of the fourth AML Directive. In particular, Recital 44 and Article 40 of the fourth AML Directive provide that obliged entities should maintain the information acquired through due diligence measures as well as records of the transactions for at least fi ve years aft er the end of the business relationship with their customer or aft er the date of an occasional transaction. Th e retention period, however, may be extended by Member Th e FATF Guidance on benefi cial ownership of October 2014 stipulated that such information may be publicly accessible, but recognizes that this may raise and needs to be balanced with privacy concerns. Fully public access was also favoured by the Parliament so that any citizen could access the information of any company in any country. Th is approach was preferred with a view to contributing to the fi ght against tax evasion, which however is not included among the objectives of the Directive and would signify a signifi cant function creep. However, such an approach was deemed by a large majority of Member States as disproportionate. See Council of the European Union, Document 16221/14, 2.12.2014, p. 2-4. 90 It is noteworthy that the Directive enumerates (albeit in a non-exhaustive manner) diff erent activities which involve the processing of personal data.
States for an additional fi ve years aft er a thorough assessment of the necessity and proportionality of such further retention and consider it to be justifi ed as necessary for the prevention, detection or investigation of money laundering or terrorist fi nancing.
Finally, such rules are without prejudice to the national criminal law on evidence applicable to ongoing criminal investigations and legal proceedings. Th e aforementioned rules raise grave proportionality concerns. While a retention period of fi ve years may seem reasonable (although it would have been welcomed if specifi c arguments had been provided), the possible extension of another fi ve years gives Member States a large amount of leeway. It would have been preferable if the fourth AML Directive provided for a possible extension of the retention period aft er a careful assessment on a caseby-case basis, as the EDPS had suggested, 91 or at least for specifi c guidelines as to the circumstances under which such an extension would be necessary.
Finally, Article 41(3) of the fourth AML Directive refers to the right of information of the individuals concerned providing that prior to the establishment of a business relationship or carrying out an occasional transaction they must be informed about the legal obligation under which obliged entities are. While this is a welcome provision, it is uncertain whether a customer would understand the purpose for which the personal data were collected and retained, in particular whether they would be processed for commercial purposes as well. Th e right to access to the data is even more worrying. According to Article 41(4) of the fourth AML Directive Member States are allowed to restrict it in order to enable the obliged entity or competent national authority to properly fulfi l its tasks or to avoid obstructing offi cial or legal inquiries, analyses, investigations or procedures set out in the Directive. As with other provisions on data protection, it leaves wide discretion to Member States to determine the cases in which a person may not have access to their information.
Th e right of access prescribed not only in the Data Protection Directive 92 but also in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (the Charter) 93 and any limitation must be strictly interpreted. Th e EU legislator should have at least provided some guidelines as to when such limitation would be necessary and proportionate. Also, it should have mentioned that this limitation should be used on an exceptional basis. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Parliament had allowed some latitude in its report, 91 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) on a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing, and a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds, 4.7.2013, https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/ Opinions/2013/13-07-04_Money_laundering_EN.pdf, p. 14. suggesting that if access is denied by an obliged entity or competent authority, the data subject could have the right to request via the national data protection authority any verifi cations of, access and corrections to or erasure of his or her personal data, as well as the right to lodge a judicial procedure. 94 Overall, the data protection rules as formulated in the fi nal text are a signifi cant step forward in comparison to the previous regime. However, a number of issues are left to the discretion of the Member States allowing a great amount of leeway for diverging practices and raising proportionality issues. A fi nal note on the data protection provisions of the fourth AML Directive: according to Article 43 of that Directive, the processing of personal data is considered 'a matter of public interest' under the Data Protection Directive. Th e extent to which this must be the relevant ground for data processing is doubtful. It appears that a more relevant ground might be the requirement to comply with a legal obligation by the obliged entities, competent authorities and FIUs. 95 
§5. THE FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ASPECT: ELABORATING THE RULES ON THE OPERATION OF FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS AND THEIR COOPERATION
A question which is oft en left relatively unexplored in the evolution of the global and EU anti-money laundering regime is what happens to personal and fi nancial data (in particular suspicious transaction reports) once they have left the private sector entities who are under the obligation to report. Data supplied by the private sector under antimoney laundering law reaches organizations which are called fi nancial intelligence units. Th us far, EU law has regulated FIUs in a manner of brevity, with few general provisions in the AML Directives and a third pillar Decision on FIU co-operation. 96 Importantly, EU law has not imposed upon Member States a specifi c model of FIUs. Hence FIUs have developed organically at national level and have taken many diff erent forms, which can be categorized broadly into four models: police FIUs, administrative FIUs, judicial FIUs and independent FIUs. 97 Th ese diff erences in national models of FIUs can be explained by eff orts by Member States to accommodate the new preventive anti-money laundering framework within their legal and fi nancial systems. In particular, the placement of FIUs outside the criminal justice sector (preferred in the majority of EU Member States), refl ects the view that suspicious transaction reportswhich are transferred by the private sector to be fi ltered by FIUs -are not necessarily relevant to criminal proceedings. Hence, keeping reports outside the criminal justice system initially will help safeguard the privacy of aff ected individuals while creating trust in the system between the regulated and the regulators. Th is focus towards independence is also refl ected in the concessions off ered by the AML Directives to legal professionals, with Member States as mentioned above having the option of designating other regulatory bodies (such as bar associations) as recipients of suspicious transaction reports by lawyers. Th e fourth AML Directive introduces a number of changes to this framework via a series of detailed provisions. One of the key objectives behind the revision of the EU money laundering framework was to enhance the powers of FIUs, particularly with regard to the cross-border cooperation between them. 98 Until then, such cooperation was addressed by Council Decision 2000/624/JHA 99 which concerned arrangements between national FIUs in respect of exchanging information. Th e third AML Directive merely stated that coordination and cooperation between FIUs, including the establishment of an EU FIU-net, should be encouraged to the greatest possible extent and for that purpose the Commission would provide assistance. 100 In this context, the proposal aimed at introducing new provisions regarding FIU powers and cooperation, including an explicit legal basis for the matching of anonymous data between the FIUs and clarifying the circumstances under which exchange of information could take place. 101 It was admitted that while these amendments would not solve all existing diffi culties in the exchange of Th is was necessary for two reasons; fi rst, to streamline EU legislation with the FATF Recommendations; and secondly, to expressly include terrorist fi nancing within the scope of FIU action. See Commission Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing and the proposal for a Regulation on information accompanying transfers of funds, SWD(2013) 21 fi nal, p. 110-111. information domain, they would enhance both legal clarity and the eff ectiveness of the fi ght against money laundering and fi nancing terrorism. 102 
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF FIUS
Th e fourth AML Directive calls for the setting up of 'operationally independent and autonomous FIUs' at the national level to collect and analyse the information that they receive with the aim of establishing links between suspicious transactions and underlying criminal activity so as to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorism fi nancing. 103 Recital 37 of the fourth AML Directive (replicated in Article 32(3) of the fourth AML Directive) explains that an operationally independent and autonomous FIU is understood as the unit that 'has the authority and capacity to carry out its functions freely, including the autonomous decision to analyse, request and disseminate specifi c information'. 104 Th e fourth AML Directive requires that suspicious transactions and other information regarding money laundering should be reported to the FIU, which should serve as a central national unit for receiving, analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities the results of its analyses. 105 In fact, it is made clear that the duty to report is not dependent on the amount of the transaction. 106 Moreover, Article 21 of the third AML Directive, referring to the powers and tasks of FIUs has undergone certain modifi cations. In particular, Article 32(4) of the fourth AML Directive prescribes that FIUs shall be able to respond to requests for information by competent authorities in their respective states, when such requests are triggered by concerns relating to money laundering, associate predicate off ences or terrorist fi nancing. 107 Th e decision of whether to conduct the analysis or dissemination of information remains with the unit. 108 However, the EU legislator added two 102 Alternatively, the Commission envisaged the establishment of a single European FIU entrusted with the reception, analysis and dissemination to the competent authorities of the information obtained from obliged entities. Such a system would stumble upon national objections concerning sovereignty. See ibid.
103
Recital 37 and Article 32(3) of fourth AML Directive. It is noteworthy that the proposal did not contain a reference to the need that the FIUs are operationally independent and autonomous. Compare Recital 25 and Article 31(3) of the proposal (Commission Proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system for the purpose of money laundering including terrorist fi nancing, COM(2013) 45 fi nal). Th e addition in Recital 37 of fourth AML Directive that a FIU should operationally independent and autonomous was proposed by the Council. See Council Document 13215/13, p. 8.
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Th e defi nition of what an operationally independent and autonomous FIU means was inserted at a later stage. See Council of the European Union, Document 10970/14 (General approach), 13.6.14, p. 9. circumstances under which FIUs will not be obliged to comply with the request for information: a) where there are objective grounds for assuming that the provision of such information would have a negative eff ect on ongoing investigations or analyses, or, b) in exceptional circumstances, where disclosure of the information would be clearly disproportionate to the legitimate interests of a natural or legal person or irrelevant with regard to the purposes for which it has been requested. Another addition is that FIUs are required to provide feedback as how they made use of the information provided and about the outcome of the investigations or inspections performed on the basis of that information. 109 Th us, elements of transparency and accountability are inserted in the FIUs powers.
Furthermore, FIUs are empowered to take urgent action directly or indirectly, where there is a suspicion that a transaction is related to money laundering or terrorist fi nancing, to suspend or withhold consent to a transaction that is proceeding, in order to analyse the transaction, confi rm the suspicion and disseminate the results of the analysis to the competent authorities. 110 In this regard, the Council added that the FIU shall be able to take such action even when that was requested by an FIU established in another Member State on the basis of the national law of the FIU receiving the request. 111 In addition, a new rule regarding the analysis function of the FIU is introduced. Th is function will consist of an operational analysis which focuses on individual cases and specifi c targets or on appropriate selected information, depending on the type and volume of the disclosures received and the expected use of the information aft er dissemination and of a strategic analysis addressing money laundering and terrorism fi nancing trends and patterns. 112 Finally, minor additions have been inserted in Article 22 of the third AML Directive concerning the duties of obliged entities with regard to FIUs. First, obliged entities are mandated to inform the FIU about suspicious transactions including by fi ling a report and in such cases there is an explicit duty to promptly respond to requests by the FIU for additional information. 113 
B. COOPERATION BETWEEN FIUs
Th e improvement of exchange of information between FIUs across the EU is placed high in the hierarchy of measures to address money laundering and terrorist fi nancing. In this context, special reference is made to the decentralized computer network FIU.et or its successor and the techniques off ered by it. 114 Furthermore, Recital 55 of the fourth AML Directive highlights the role of the EU Financial Intelligence Unit Platform (EU FIUs Platform), an informal group composed of representatives from FIUs, which has been active since 2006. 115 Moreover, in the light of the extension of predicate off ences to include tax crimes, it is clarifi ed that the exchange of information on cases concerning tax crimes should be without prejudice to the exchange of information taking place on the basis of Directive 2011/16/EU or in accordance with international rules concerning tax matters. 116 Finally, Recital 58 is a new addition to the fourth AML Directive in comparison to the Proposal and sets out certain basic rules as to how FIUs' cooperation should take place: in particular, Member States should encourage their competent authorities to provide (rapidly, constructively and eff ectively) the widest range of crossborder cooperation for the purposes of the fourth AML Directive. More importantly, the fourth AML Directive mandates free, spontaneous or upon request, information exchange between FIUs established in the EU and third-country fi nancial intelligence units, having regard to EU law and to the principles relating to information exchange as developed by the Egmont Group of FIUs. 117 Moving to the core of the Directive, Article 51 of the fourth AML Directive refers to the role of the Commission within the FIU cooperation framework. In order to facilitate coordination, including information exchange, the Commission is enabled to convene regular meetings of the EU FIU's platform composed of representatives from Member States' FIUs. Th e addition of this article in comparison to the previous regime lies in the extensive references to the work of the platform, as also highlighted in Recital 55 of the fourth AML Directive. It is mentioned in this regard that it may facilitate cooperation among FIUs, exchange views and provide advice on implementation issues relevant for FIUs and reporting entities as well as on cooperation-related issues such as: eff ective FIU cooperation; the identifi cation of suspicious transactions with a cross-border dimension; the standardization of reporting formats through the FIU.net platform or its successor; the joint analysis of cross-border cases and the identifi cation of trends and factors relevant to assessing the risks of money laundering; and terrorist fi nancing at national and supranational level. 118 As regards the coordination between FIUs as such, it needs to be stressed at the outset that the fourth AML Directive requires Member States to ensure that FIUs cooperate with each other 'to the greatest extent possible' irrespective of the model they have chosen for their organization. 119 Overall, the EU rules regarding exchange of information are highly favourable towards information exchange and provide very limited restrictions 115 Th is Recital was added in Council Document 13215/13, p. 19.
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Recital 56 of fourth AML Directive.
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To a large extent this recital was added by the Council. See Council Document 16775/13, p. 12.
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Ibid., p. 56.
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Article 52 of fourth AML Directive. In this regard, the European Parliament had suggested specifi c reference to the need to ensure compliance with data protection rules. See Council of the European Union, Document 7387/14, 13.3.14, p. 67. 287 in this regard. In particular, according to Article 53(1) of the fourth AML Directive, FIUs are empowered to exchange, spontaneously or upon request, any information that may be relevant for the processing or analysis of information by the FIU related to money laundering or terrorist fi nancing, 'even if the type of predicate off ence that may be at stake is not identifi ed at the time of the exchange'. 120 In terms of the procedure, Article 53(1) of the fourth AML Directive further sets out the necessary elements that a request for information exchange should contain, namely the relevant facts, background information, reasons for the request and how the information sought will be used. In order to ensure extensive cooperation, diff erent exchange mechanisms may be used if so agreed between the FIUs, in particular as regards exchanges through the FIU.net platform or its successor. 121 Besides, in cases when a report concerns another Member State, then the FIU must promptly forward it to the FIU of that Member State. 122 Th e permissive approach of the Directive as regards cooperation between FIUs is further attested in Article 53(2) of the fourth AML Directive, according to which FIUs must be able to use the whole range of their available powers that they would normally use domestically for receiving and analysing information when it applies to a request for information from another FIU. Th en the request should be replied to in a timely manner and if a FIU requests additional information from an obliged entity established in another Member State which operates on its territory, the request should be addressed to the FIU of the Member States in whose territory the obliged entity is established. 123 Perhaps the most notable example of the wide possibilities for information exchange off ered by the Directive can be found in Article 53(3) of the fourth AML Directive. Th e latter prescribes the conditions under which a FIU may refuse to disclose information on the basis of a request. In principle, it must be stressed that, as Recital 56 of the fourth AML Directive suggests, requests for exchange of information should normally be approved. 124 It is only in exceptional circumstances where the exchange of information could be contrary to fundamental principles of its national law that the requested FIU may refuse to exchange information. 125 In order to ensure this practically free and unlimited information exchange between FIUs, the fourth AML Directive further requires Member States to formulate those exceptions in a way which prevents misuse of, and undue limitation on, the free exchange of information for analytical purposes. In Recital 56 of fourth AML Directive it is stated that 'the initial exchange of information between FIUs relating to money laundering or terrorist fi nancing for analytical purposes which is not further processed or disseminated should be permitted unless such exchange of information would be contrary to fundamental principles of national law'.
In this regard it is noteworthy that in comparison with the Commission proposal, this provision was signifi cantly watered down by Council during negotiations. 126 In particular, the Commission envisaged far stricter conditions for refusal to exchange information either: a) when divulging information would lead to impairment of a criminal investigation being conducted in the requested Member State; or b) in exceptional circumstances, understood as where divulgation of information would be clearly disproportionate to the legitimate interests of a natural or legal person of the Member State or irrelevant to the purposes for which it has been collected. In addition, the proposal noted that any such refusal must have been appropriately justifi ed to the FIU requesting the information. 127 In practice, the Commission proposal mirrored the conditions under which the FIU would be under no obligation to comply with a request for information by the competent national authorities. However, in the light of the fi nal text, the fourth AML Directive creates an interesting paradox; information exchange between FIUs is subject to more lenient conditions than in cases where FIUs have to respond to requests for information by the competent authorities at the national level. More importantly the term 'fundamental principles of national law' is not further elaborated, is particularly vague and may result in divergent interpretations during implementation at the national level.
Moreover, Article 54 of the fourth AML Directive provides rules concerning the aft ermath of information exchange. In this regard, it is stated that when exchanging information and documents, the transmitting FIU may impose restrictions and conditions for the use of that information, with which the receiving FIU must comply. In addition, it is explicitly pointed out that the exchanged information must be used only for the purpose for which it was sought or provided, thus making a direct reference to the purpose limitation principle. 128 As for dissemination of information by the receiving FIU to any other authority, agency or department, or any use of information for purposes beyond the ones for which exchange of information was originally approved, it is subject to the consent of the FIU providing the information. Th e Commission proposal, which referred to the 'approval' by the requested FIU rather than its 'consent', 129 included no further guidelines as regards the conditions under which such consent would be provided and the EDPS was overall satisfi ed with the provision. However, during the negotiations, Article 55 of the fourth AML Directive was expanded to further circumscribe the conditions under which the requested FIU would not provide its consent. As with cooperation between FIUs in general, the EU legislator envisages dissemination of information 'to the largest extent possible'. In this framework, the only circumstances under which a requested FIU is allowed to refuse providing its consent for further dissemination, which must be appropriate explained when applicable, are the following: a) where this would fall beyond the scope of its anti-money laundering and terrorist fi nance provisions; b) where it could lead to an impairment of a criminal investigation; c) where it would be clearly disproportionate to the legitimate interests of a natural or legal person or the Member State of the requested FIU; or d) where it would otherwise not be in accordance with fundamental principles of national law of that Member State. 131 In addition, the fourth AML Directive mandates Member States to require their FIUs to use protected channels of communication between themselves and encourage the use of the FIU.net platform or its successor. 132 Besides, FIUs must cooperate by applying state-of-the-art technologies pursuant to national law. Th ese technologies will enable FIUs to match their data with other FIUs in an anonymous way by ensuring the full protection of personal data with the aim to detect subjects of the FIU's interests in other Member States and identify their proceeds and funds. However, the EDPS had recommended that the retention period of the data exchange is defi ned and limited to what is strictly necessary in relation to the purpose of the processing, that data should be updated by designating agents responsible for this task inside the FIU and that rules should be inserted to ensure the security of data. 133 
C. CHALLENGES FOR PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION
Th e aforementioned rules regarding the cooperation between FIUs pose signifi cant challenges concerning the protection of fundamental rights, in particular privacy and data protection, of the individuals whose data is processed. Worryingly, the fourth AML Directive mandates the almost unlimited exchange of information on suspicious transactions irrespective of the organizational nature of the FIU, an issue that has always been left to the discretion of Member States. 134 First of all, this fl exibility as regards the structure of national FIUs and consequently their relationship with the police and judicial authorities signifi es that the applicable data protection framework is debatable. An illustration of the problem would be in cases when the requesting FIU is a police authority and the requested is an administrative one. According to Recital 37 of the fourth AML Directive, the purpose of FIUs is 'to collect and analyse the information which they receive with the aim of establishing links between suspicious transactions and underlying criminal activity in order to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist fi nancing'. Th erefore, the purpose of FIUs is directly related to the prevention and fi ght of specifi c crimes and as such it should fall within the Article 3(2) exception of the Data Protection Directive, according to which the latter does not apply 'to processing operations concerning public security defence, State security (…) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law'.
Th is exception triggers the application of the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA on exchange of information in criminal matters, soon to be replaced by a directive on the processing of data for criminal law purposes. 135 Given the function of FIUs as fi ltering information before this could be further disseminated to law enforcement authorities if necessary, this direction may seem more appropriate. However, this solution is not as straightforward as it may seem: for instance, the EDPS had called for a clarifi cation that FIUs are not considered 'competent authorities' within the meaning of Article 87 TFEU. In the view of the EDPS, '[d] espite the fact that they may have tasks similar to those of law enforcement authorities, they should -in the activities covered by the proposed fourth AML Directive -not be considered as police or judicial authorities'. 136 Th e fact that this suggestion was not followed up during the negotiations and the wording of the fi nal text according to which the fourth AML Directive 'is without prejudice to the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, including Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA', may be seen as further indications of the true nature of FIUs as forming part of national law enforcement arsenal. 134 Bringing the operation of FIUs into the realm of law enforcement has two consequences: fi rst, under the current regime, only the cooperation of FIUs falls within the scope of the Framework Decision because the latter does not regulate the processing of personal data at the domestic level. Th is leaves the operation of FIUs within the national territory outside the remits of special EU rules (only the Charter safeguards are applicable in this context). It is aft er the adoption and implementation of the revised Data Protection Directive that the processing of data both at the national level and EU level will be regulated. Second, the applicability of the Framework Decision signifi es that the data protection standards for individuals are heavily watered down in comparison to the 1995 Data Protection Directive. Th e most prominent example in this regard is the possibility to process exchanged data for purposes other than the ones for which the data had originally been collected. According to Article 3(2) of the Framework Decision, further processing for another purpose shall be permitted in so far as a) it is not incompatible with the purposes for which the data were collected; b) the competent authorities are authorised to process such data for such other purpose in accordance with the applicable legal provisions; and c) processing is necessary and proportionate to that other purpose.
However, even so Article 55(1) of the fourth AML Directive on the possibility to further disseminate information obtained from an FIU seems to be particularly problematic in so far as it mandates that the requested FIU must grant its consent for further dissemination of data from the requesting FIU to another agency, authority or department, to the extent possible. First of all, the article does not specify the type of authorities to which the information will be disseminated and therefore it is not explicitly stated that these should receive information only insofar as they are allowed to process FIUs' data. Secondly, even in cases when the receiving authorities may process FIUs' information (for example, police authorities that further investigate a suspicious transaction), the necessity and proportionality condition of the Framework Decision is not adequately respected by the fourth AML Directive. Instead of necessity and proportionality assessment being central in any decision for further dissemination, the threshold in the fourth AML Directive is signifi cantly higher; proportionality is one of the four conditions for refusal to grant consent. Besides, it is only when such dissemination is clearly disproportionate to the legitimate interests of the person concerned or the Member State of the requested FIU that consent shall be refused.
Th ese privacy and data protection concerns are exacerbated by recent calls by the European Commission to Member States to improve exchange of fi nancial intelligence between EU FIUs and third country FIUs and between FIUs and the private sector, in line with FATF Recommendations and best practices. 137 Th e Commission notes in this context that international standards now emphasize the importance of extending the 137 European Commission, Communication on an Action Plan for strengthening the fi ght against terrorist fi nancing, COM(2016) 50/2, p. 4. scope of the access to the information available to FIUs and this will be achieved through an amendment of the fourth AML Directive. 138 Th is is familiar territory: in the name of a renewed threat (in this case terrorism), the Commission calls for a revision of a -in this case quite recent -AML Directive in order to implement global (and in particular FATF) standards.
However, the transfer of everyday personal data to third countries on a large scale without a substantive assessment of the adequacy of their data protection framework has been found by the Court of Justice to be contrary to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 139 Moreover, the establishment of further information exchange channels between FIUs and the private sector may challenge the principle of purpose limitation and exceed the powers allocated to FIUs. A detailed privacy and data protection audit must accompany any expansion of EU law in the fi eld, in particular taking into account the lack of harmonization in relation to the nature, powers and tasks of FIUs. §6. CONCLUSION Th e analysis in this article has painted a picture of a multi-layered, constantly evolving and expanding European Union anti-money laundering legal framework. In all four main pillars of EU anti-money laundering law, measures have been regularly revised and their scope has widened. In the fi eld of criminalization, we have witnessed the proliferation of predicate off ences and the confl ation within the anti-money laundering framework of the quest to tackle phenomena as disparate as terrorist fi nance and tax evasion. In the fi eld of prevention, successive EU directives have expanded the list of the professions who are covered by the fourth AML Directive to gradually include nonfi nancial and non-regulated professions. At the same time rules on the substance of preventive duties have been further elaborated to both pay particular attention to certain categories of individuals including politically exposed persons and benefi cial owners, and to introduce a so-called 'risk-based approach' to prevention. In the fi eld of fi nancial intelligence, EU law -and in particular the fourth AML Directive -has introduced more detailed rules on the operation of fi nancial intelligence units, with their establishment however still fi rmly grounded on national law.
Th roughout the evolution of EU anti-money laundering law, the impact of globalization on EU action -and in particular of the Recommendations of the FATF -has been striking. In all cases mentioned above, EU law has been revised to take into account developments in the FATF Recommendations. Th e more these standards develop in this manner, however, the more likely it is for the EU legislator to face constitutional and fundamental rights objections. Key examples in this context constitute the recent calls for the expansion of co-operation between fi nancial intelligence units and the extension of confi scation powers, which may fall foul of national constitutional provisions, the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Th is landscape demonstrates the limits of the normative outcome of a single agenda, technocratic and expert organization such as the FATF within the broader European Union constitutional context. Th e tension between attempts to extend the fi eld of enforcement in money laundering law, justifi ed as responding to FATF Recommendations and security threats on the one hand, and upholding constitutional provisions and fundamental rights on the other, is ongoing and will not go away. As the Commission's recent Action Plan on terrorist fi nance has demonstrated, anti-money laundering law will always be used in a chameleon manner, adjusted to provide ready responses to every security threat arising in the political vocabulary.
